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Philosophy and Social Criticism (July 2017)

Social Imaginaries and the Theory of the Normative Utterance1
Meili Steele

Theorists of the social imaginary, such as Benedict Anderson, Charles Taylor, Cornelius
Castoriadis, and Marcel Gauchet have given us new ways to talk about the structures of the
shared meanings and practices of the West. As a group, they have directed their arguments
against the narrow horizons of meaning deployed by deliberative political theories in developing
their basic normative concepts and principles. Anderson speaks of the new shapes of time and
space provided by the novel and newspaper; Taylor and Gauchet discuss the ontological
importance of the emergence of secularity, the public sphere, popular sovereignty, and the
market; Castoriadis places creative collective imagination at the center of his work. They have
provided an alternative to the oscillation between the constructivism of John Rawls, Jürgen
Habermas, and Christine Korsgaard and the realism of Raymond Guess, Raymond Williams, and
others.2 Theorists of the imaginary have enabled us to think about normatively charged collective
imaginaries as logically prior to the construction of normative principles.3
What theorists of the imaginary have not done is make specific connections between the
ontological background of social imaginaries and the normative utterance. This lacuna has left
them vulnerable to the charges of “normative deficit” and vagueness that Habermas and others
famously make against philosophies of “world disclosure.”4 To be sure, philosophers of the
imaginary are careful to supplement third-person accounts of political culture with
phenomenological descriptions; however, when theorists of the imaginary move from the
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common background provided by imaginaries to the first- and second person, the focus is usually
on the imagination as a faculty rather than on the new conception of the normative utterance and
political dialogue that follows from an understanding of the social imaginary.5 I will consider the
relationship of social imaginaries to individual utterances so that we do not have the individual
imagination set against the social context, but the utterance as reproducing and/or intervening in
the imaginary structures. In this view, normativity is not expressed in the propositional form of
the Rawlsian or Habermasian justification, but through a complex engagement with the
worldhood that informs normative judgments. Looking at the normative utterance through the
lens of social imaginaries enables us to engage the background structures that subtend discrete
utterances, and this engagement requires richer forms of argument than what we find in
constructivist or realist conceptions of normativity.
I will proceed in three steps. I begin by contrasting the constructivist approach with
Charles Taylor’s philosophy of social imaginaries and world disclosure since his work makes an
explicit link between ontology and utterance. I then bring out the shortcomings of Taylor’s
approach by examining briefly his debate with Robert Brandom over world-disclosure and the
exchange of reasons. This analysis gives rise to my own account of the normative utterance,
which I develop by looking at two examples. The first is a short story—Susan Glaspell’s “A Jury
of Her Peers”—that dramatizes the discovery of fissures in what was taken to be a shared
background and that articulates the normative relevance of these fissures by arguing through and
with the social imaginary rather than normative propositions. I then show how this kind of
reading exposes the inadequacies in Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of narrative, which Taylor—and
many other philosophers—endorse and which occludes the normative claims of narrative
utterances. The second example looks at two very different ways of engaging the American
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imaginary surrounding race: Barack Obama’s “A More Perfect Union,” and Ta-Nahisi Coates’s
normative challenge to Obama’s discursive form, Between the World and Me. Obama’s speech
reanimates a canonical normative discursive framework for understanding race, Brown v Board
of Education, which continues to exercise its power over public debate. Coates attacks this
framework not by analyzing a principle of justice but by displaying the unacknowledged
conflicts in the imaginary, conflicts that go unrecognized by whites and that blacks struggle to
articulate. He writes in the form of a letter to his son, in which he deploys various kinds of
discourse--phenomenological description, narrative, and sociological generalization--to give a
portrait of racial division in contemporary American life. In addressing the imaginary, Coates
reveals the failure of our current language of facts and norms.
Thrownness and Social Imaginaries
In the hermeneutic perspective initiated by Heidegger, we are thrown into the world, into
social imaginaries so that morality builds on norms that are already in place, on norms which are
not constructed. In other words, normativity emerges through the social imaginary in a way that
is logically prior to the conceptual formulations of ethical and political philosophy.6 What Taylor
and the other philosophers of the imaginary cited above have done is take this transcendental
hermeneutic point made by Heidegger and Gadamer about worldhood and refined the
historiography with the help of work by historians and sociologists in order to examine the
emergence and modification of particular collective historical shapes. Taylor says,
“The social imaginary is not a set of ideas;” rather, the imaginary forms the background that
makes sense of “the practices of a society […Thus,] the notion of a moral order goes beyond
some proposed schedule of norms that ought to govern our mutual relations and/or political life
[…] The image of order carries not only a definition of what is right, but of the context in which
it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right.” 7 The social imaginary concerns the
3

ways that “ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings and this is often not expressed in
theoretical terms but in images, stories, legends, etc…. The social imaginary is that common
understanding which makes possible common practices and widely shared sense of legitimacy.”8
These imaginaries form the background out of which we think and act but “which we do not
entirely understand. To ascribe total personal responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out
of the human condition.” 9
Such a conception of normativity demands a very different form of questioning than the
constructivist approach. In understanding and defending normative claims, we must locate
ourselves in the space of historical imaginaries and argue through these imaginaries rather than
finding principles to which all should agree. Hence, “the task of reason is to articulate this
background, what we presuppose when we make a judgment that a certain form of life is truly
worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement.”10 These are the conditions of
intentionality.11
We can see the relationship of the ontological background (the political) to politics in
Taylor’s work by looking quickly at A Secular Age. At the beginning of A Secular Age, he
distinguishes three kinds of secularism. The concerns of philosophers of public reason are placed
in “Secularity 1,” which focuses on the retreat of religion from the common institutions and
practices “most obviously, but not only, the state.”12 This is the normative, political secularism of
public reason that addresses controversies such as the wearing of headscarves to school or the
display of religious symbols on state grounds. A second sense of secularity refers to the decline
of religious belief and practice—people no longer going to church, synagogue or mosque, for
instance. This sociological approach is often called “secularization.” The third and most
important sense of secularity for Taylor concerns the shift in “the conditions of belief” since this
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sense gives a place to the ontological history he finds important. In this view, the “shift to
secularity consists of a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and
unproblematic to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not
the easiest to embrace.” 13 In other words, Taylor wants to examine the shift “which takes us
from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith,
even for the staunchest believers, is one possibility among others.” 14 Taylor’s claim for
Secularity 3 is not simply that this is a better description of contemporary society’s
understanding of religion and secularity. His claim is philosophical. Although we may have
much to learn from researchers in Secularity 1 and 2, they have left out the worldhood of the
world. Sociologists may focus on gathering statistics about church or synagogue attendance as
evidence of secularization, while political philosophers may assert the uncontroversial “fact of
pluralism” in order to focus on the construction of norms of mutual accommodation. 15 But
before these facts or norms can appear, they require a background that lets them show up for us
as phenomena. Of course, people can bring different ideas and attitudes to a secularity, “but what
they do not bring into the negotiations is the set of ideas and norms constitutive of [secularity
itself]. This must be the common property of society before there can be any question of [debate].
Hence, they are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some individual, but rather
intersubjective meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find
themselves and act.”16 Hence, Taylor’s question is: what are the background assumptions,
practices, languages, etc. that make the contemporary experience of the secular and the religious
possible, for believers, agnostics, and atheists? We stand in a normed world of social imaginaries
that cannot be set aside to get clear about particular normative concepts.
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Taylor does a genealogy of Western secularity that gives a new account of how our
current background assumptions emerged, drawing out new historical richness and complexity
that becomes available and normatively relevant through this problematic. We cannot just toss in
a vague, schematic historical tale about how secularity emerged from the wars of religion and
modern science in order to focus on the principles of public reason.17 Rather, “our sense of where
we are is crucially defined in part by a story of how we got there. . . . And just because we
describe where we are in relating a journey, we can misdescribe it grievously by misidentifying
the itinerary. That is what the subtraction accounts of modernity have in fact done. To get
straight where we are, we have to go back and tell the story properly.”18 To get oriented to the
world and our place in it requires more than abstract principles—such as “the separation of
church and state”—for they block out the massive background that shapes reasoning.
Normativity cannot swing free from contestable historical accounts of how our selfunderstandings came about because it is woven from specific social imaginaries. Hence, Taylor
wants to begin reasoning by reopening the assumptions of modernity and displaying the
complex, conflicted historical inheritance that lies behind current usage.
The articulation of background social imaginaries brings in the third-person point of view
that is excluded by the constructivist view, and it joins up with Taylor’s long-standing objection
to such theories of practical reason because they “cannot articulate the background understanding
surrounding any conviction that we ought not act in this or that way.” 19 However, we need to
distinguish two kinds of articulations or “world disclosures” that Taylor sometimes conflates. 20
On the one hand, there is articulation “of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world;
the world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves,”21 and, on the other hand,
there is the utterance, the “reflective disclosure.” The articulation of background is concerned
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with our passive relationship to structures of intelligibility, such as we find in Taylor’s
discussion of the public sphere, popular sovereignty in Modern Social Imaginaries, or Secularity
3 in A Secular Age. Here the language of articulation is a socio-historical language of social
imaginaries. These structures can be characterized in various ways, and Taylor slides—much as
the narrator of a third-person novel does—between sociological explanations, what he calls
“neo-Durkheimian moments,” and articulations that are close to phenomenological description of
individual and collective experience displayed through everyday speech.
The utterance or “reflective disclosure”—and here I modify Kompridis’s definition—is
the intervention in the prereflective practices and structures of meaning by an utterance, work of
art, a film, historical or philosophical text, etc. The individual makes claims through and against
the social imaginaries in which she finds herself. Reflective disclosure reworks the languages
and structures used to make sense of ourselves and the world, and these interventions can take
the form of normative arguments, as we will see. The transcendental argument against
constructivist arguments does not just show the relevance of background structures to our selfunderstanding; it authorizes new forms of argument. We are now ready for Taylor’s debate with
Brandom over just this issue.
Problems with Intervention as World Disclosure
In a recent debate on language and rationality, Taylor and Brandom agree on many of the
holistic assumptions of hermeneutics—what Brandom calls “Gadamerian platitudes”—but differ
on the relationship of world disclosure to conceptual understanding and the exchange of
reasons.22 Brandom insists that we “draw a bright line between conceptual understanding and
other kinds of symbolic disclosedness.” 23 In this view, “broadly symbolic [dimensions of
language] in Cassirer’s sense, are not conceptual in the narrow propositional sense that I render
in terms of inference and reasons.”24 He clarifies this by drawing on Wittgenstein’s well-known
7

analogy of language as a city, “Language for [Wittgenstein] is all suburbs, merging
imperceptibly into the surround and supporting countryside of linguistic practices, and having no
downtown. But I think language does have a downtown, and that is the practice of giving and
asking for reasons.”25 The practice of giving and asking for reasons swings free not only of
symbolic uses but of particular forms of life.
Taylor, on the other hand, does not think we can isolate reason from giving disclosure in
this way, “I remain convinced that the articulative [disclosive] cannot be peeled off from the
public giving of and asking for reasons.” 26Any exchange over “the factual state of things” can
only make sense if we set them “in the context of our ability to operate through the whole range
of symbolic forms.”27 Hence, “there are certain matters which can’t be properly explored without
recourse to the disclosive dimension. There couldn’t be an intelligent discussion of the beauty of
landscape which didn’t either deploy or draw on our familiarity with, say, certain paintings.
There couldn’t be a discussion of Christian piety which didn’t draw on, say, the music of Bach,
or certain hymns, or Chartres cathedral or an evocative life of Saint Francis.” For Taylor, there is
a continuum between pure assertion—e.g., “soup’s on!”—where something is asserted but
nothing is disclosed, and pure disclosure—e.g., Chopin’s Fantaisie-Impromptu in C Sharp
Minor, which “articulates a certain as yet indefinable longing….A human possibility is
articulated and disclosed here, but nothing is asserted.”28 Taylor gives artistic disclosure a
privileged access to the distinctiveness of a form of life at the same time that he makes this
disclosure ineffable. But this perspicacity does not have to define itself against conceptual
understanding or the language of ordinary prose, as we will see.
Although Brandom and Taylor share a holistic critique of the Kantian understanding of
the concept—according to which the institution of conceptual norms is separate from their
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application—they develop different kinds of holism.29 For Brandom, the key is Hegelian
reconstruction, “[T]he rationality of the current decision, its justifiability as a correct application
of a concept, is secured by rationally reconstructing the tradition of its applications according to
a certain model—by offering a selective, cumulative, expressively progressive genealogy of it.
At each stage in its development, it is insofar as one takes the tradition to be rational, by a
Whiggish rewriting of its history, that one makes the tradition be and have been rational…This is
reason’s march through history. In this way, as Hegel puts it, contingency is given necessity.”30
In his book on Hegel, Taylor states his opposition to this reconstructive logic of transparent
concepts, insisting that “the clarity of our most explicit conceptual formulations reposes on a
background of which we are not fully aware.”31 Brandom concludes that Taylor is not a
rationalist. 32 While I agree with Taylor on the Hegelian question, his alternative does not
provide a satisfying account of normativity.
Taylor focuses his attention on the Heideggerian point—that logical forms of language
depend upon a background—rather than connecting background and normativity into an
adequate conception of language and argument. In theorizing the individual utterance, Taylor
makes a move that is all too typical of both defenders and critics of world disclosure by defining
disclosure against everyday speech and normativity. In lumping together various aesthetic works
and ignoring the disclosive power of everyday language, he fails to address the normative claims
of “disclosive” writing that could answer disclosure’s critics. It is one thing to respect the
insights provided by literary language: “We delude ourselves if we think a philosophical or
critical language is somehow more hard-edged and more free from personal index than that of
poets or novelists;”33 however, it is another to give literature blanket insight beyond challenge,
ignoring the ways that literature can often be misleading, repulsive, or just stupid. By giving
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literature this vatic status, he gives weight to Christina Lafont’s charge (cited in note 2 above)
that “world disclosure seems unrevisable from within and inaccessible from without,” a charge to
which I will respond directly.34
Taylor follows the German hermeneutic tradition here, in placing art, particularly poetry,
against prose and everyday speech. Wolf Lepenies notes that “the antithesis of literature and
poetry has been maintained in all its severity only in Germany, where it has been exacerbated
through an asociality of poetical production in principle, that even sees its chief task as being the
‘refutation of the social.’”35 Gadamer, for instance, for all his emphasis on dialogue, still gives
art privileged disclosive access to our being in the world in a way that exempts art from
normative claims: “Prior to all conceptual scientific knowledge, the way in which we look upon
the world, and upon our whole being-in-the-world, takes shape in art.”36 Gadamer opposes
poetry and philosophy to everyday language: “Poetry and philosophy are both set off from the
exchange of language as it takes place in practical activity and in science.” 37
The opposition of poetry and prose has meant hostility to the distinctive genre of
modernity, the novel. The novel is attentive to the dynamic interplay of the multiple languages of
public life, languages ignored by Heidegger and Gadamer. Taylor views the novel mostly
through a sociological lens, in which the novel helps shape the modern sense of space and time
and helps establish the dignity of everyday life (Sources of the Self, Part III). The language of
literature is a poetic language for Taylor, a language tied to the search for spiritual significance,
not to its relevance to public, normative debates. Much of his discussion of disclosure has a
religious character to it, and we can see this in his emphasis on the connection between
disclosure and epiphanic poetry in Sources of the Self and his emphasis on “fullness” in A
Secular Age.
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In his new book, The Language Animal, the closest he comes to connecting imaginaries
and normativity is when he discusses “accessive” and “existential” disclosure. Accessive
disclosures “open a new range of phenomena to us, for instance terms to classify animals or
trees.” 38 Existential disclosure offers “a new way of describing, or a new model for
understanding, our human condition and the alternatives it opens for us…..We may come to this
existential insight through meeting, or hearing about, some paradigmatic figure (the Buddha, St.
Francis), or by reading a book about ethics or the meaning of life or (more often) by seeing a
film.”39 Existential disclosures are made available through the language of “portrayal” rather than
the language of assertion—e.g., Dostoevsky’s Devils (78). A “portrayal can be an alternative
way of offering models to understand human life, alternative, that is to description.”40 He calls
this mode “regestalting,” but this way of talking takes away any argumentative or normative
claim. In my view, such “regestalting” can be understood as normative revision that can play on
the same field with principled argument.
Taylor similarly characterizes narratives by opposing them to assertions. He emphasizes
how narratives cannot be translated into assertions rather than showing how narratives are woven
into assertions and can challenge them: “Everybody would probably grant my first assertion
above, that narrative constitutes a way of offering insight into causes, characters, values,
alternative ways of being and the like. But many would baulk at the second affirmation that this
form is unsubstitutable.”41
In addition, Taylor blocks out the power of imaginaries to shape the concepts, with which
they are imbricated. When speaking of the interaction of concepts and imaginaries, he speaks of
concepts “trickling down” into imaginaries but does not examine the ways that imaginaries shape
concepts:
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When a theory penetrates and transforms the social imaginary…, people take up, or are
inducted into new practices. These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first
articulated in theory…but this process isn’t just one sided; a theory making over a social
imaginary. The theory in coming to make sense of the action is glossed, as it were, given
a particular shape as the context of these practices. Rather like Kant’s notion of an
abstract category becoming ‘schematized’ when it is applied to reality in space and time,
the theory is schematized in the dense sphere of common practice.42
This misstates relationship of concepts to imaginaries. The languages of the social
imaginaries do not schematize concepts, for schematization ignores the dynamics of languages
and dialogue in which imaginaries help produce concepts, reducing them to a derivative
philosophical operation. Rethinking normativity involves thematizing and revising a package of
concepts and imaginaries. Such a conception of the social is lost in the notion of schematization,
which carries unfortunate Kantian baggage that renders imaginaries secondary. Imaginaries are
not separate from the conceptual argument and should not be relegated to the secondary status, as
my examples will show.
For all the richness of his two most recent books, The Language Animal and Retrieving
Realism, Taylor never moves to integrate his views on language with social imaginaries. In fact,
the idea of social imaginaries never appears in these works.43 These works are complex and
interesting—I can hardly summarize them here—but they say nothing to contradict the critique I
have advanced. In my view, social imaginaries inform our most basic practical engagements with
the world and their relationship to particular utterances can be made visible and provide a space
for a new conception of disclosure and practical reasoning.
Reasoning through the Social Imaginary in Glaspell’s “A Jury of Her Peers”
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Susan Glaspell’s short story “A Jury of Her Peers” (1917) offers a phenomenology of
interpretation in a straightforward everyday language that opens the boundaries of art and
everyday speech and shows how narratives can make normative arguments. The story dramatizes
a “world historical” shift in the normative imaginary of gender, a shift that goes far beyond the
formal political inclusion of women through the extension of the principle of equality, which was
achieved three years after the story was published through the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
The title of the story alludes to the debates that preceded its passage.
The tale begins when Mrs. Hale is called from her work in the kitchen to join her
husband, Mr. Peters (the sheriff), and his wife. Mrs. Hale, the center of focalization for the thirdperson narrative, learns that Mr. Wright, the husband of an old friend, has been killed. The
sheriff suspects that Mrs. Hale’s friend Minnie has killed her husband. The group proceeds to the
Wrights’ home, where it splits up. The men go out to the barn to look for evidence that can
establish a motive for Minnie, while the women wait in the kitchen. While sitting there, they
encounter the “text” of Minnie’s life—the dirty towels, the mishandled stitching on her quilt, the
act of violence of which she is suspected, and so on. That is, the dominant tradition that the
women bring to Minnie’s house, a tradition that they share with their husbands, forms
preunderstandings that do not help them reconstitute the self-understanding of the text. The men
have called Minnie “mad,” and the women at this point can articulate no other reading, even
though they sense that more is at stake here for them.
Slowly the women start to put together an explanation of the strangeness of Minnie’s
text—the systematic psychological torture to which her husband subjected her, a torture that
culminated in the strangulation of Minnie’s double, her pet bird. The process of coming to this
explanation forces them to transform the understandings of their own lives and indeed the
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gendered imaginaries of the time. Minnie’s text asks them disturbing questions, not just the other
way around.
They discover that Minnie’s husband was not just “a cruel man” but also a typical one
and that Minnie’s response differs only in degree, not in kind, from the ones they have had but
ignored or repressed. It is important that Mr. Wright commits no actionable offense. He merely
brings into relief the norms that are already there, norms that inform the actions within many
marriages. The story’s off-stage narrator shows their complex interaction with the text—
sometimes it grabs them and sometimes they push it away—that is rarely made explicit in their
consciousness or in dialogue. The women are not exchanging claims in discursive dialogue in
which they use the constructed political concepts to unmask ideology. They are experiencing a
challenging rupture—and Glaspell is displaying it—in the reigning package of concepts and
imaginaries surrounding marriage and gender. The context of their reading—their moments of
isolation interrupted by their husbands’ condescending remarks about the triviality of women’s
occupations—helps foster their transformative reading. The women come to understand that the
values and textures of their own lives are neither read nor recognized by their husbands and that
the forces that drove Minnie mad operate around and within them as well. The women discover
the narrow social space in which they have been channeled to live and the anger that they have
been socialized to ignore.
The boundaries of their selves have been unraveled as Minnie’s text not only speaks to
them but for them: “It was as if something within her not herself had spoken, and it found in
Mrs. Peters something that she did not know as herself.”44 Interpretation in this story is
dramatized as an event, not an act. When Mrs. Peters discovers the strangled bird, she does not
just solve a detective’s riddle; she reworks the fabric of her memory and identity. As she recalls
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and revises the story of what a boy with a hatchet had done to her cat many years ago, she gets
back the rage of the past moment: “‘If they hadn’t held me back, I would have….’” Minnie’s text
forces them to see themselves and their husbands in a way that requires a new language that
gives distinctiveness and worth to their lives and that goes unread by the dominant culture. The
women do not empathize with Minnie, for empathy implies a subject to subject model of reading
that ignores the normative work of the story. The text develops a descriptive/normative language
that did not yet exist so that we do not have normative principles on one side and the facts on the
other. New normative languages make new facts and meanings available.45
Unlike Minnie, they are able to create a way of speaking that unites them with each other
and separates them from the men. They have formed a powerful normative language that gives
them reasons to do something they never could have imagined before they arrived at the
Wrights’ house. They have created a “new space of reasons,” to use Sellars’s famous phrase.46
The story implicitly takes a stance with regard to existing imaginaries and in doing so creates its
own space in which existing norms are engaged and modified.
Their interpretations open a new, hitherto unthinkable space of action: they choose to
hide the bird (conceal evidence), betray their husbands, and break the law. There is nothing
ineffable about this disclosure, but the reasons of the argument do not appear in terms of the
principles of public reason, such as justice and equality. Certainly, such notions inform the
background, but these conceptual principles are woven into the textures of their shared
imaginaries. Indeed, concepts and imaginaries worked together to form an imprisoning
discursive package that Minnie’s text calls into question and pushes them to revise. The thirdperson narrator articulates the new space of understanding that emerges for them without ever
reducing it to a conceptual label.
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Thus, in answer to Brandom’s charge that world disclosure does not offer reasons, I
would say that this story is Susan Glaspell’s disclosive, argumentative reasoning. It offers a
complex account of the discovery of violence embedded in one configuration of norms and
meanings, of one configuration of reasoning giving. How does one go from not seeing
domination to seeing it? Not through the application of a constructed principle, but by attending
to the normative articulations made by Minnie’s text, articulations that open up new ways of
being in the world. The women are not “finally” understanding what the constructed principle of
“equality” or “justice” means. They reason by tacking between accounts of their ontological
background and the interpretive normative intervention that they make. In displaying the
women’s transformation in a story, Glaspell shows us how normative argument always depends
on contestable assumptions in the background imaginaries and how we can thematize these
assumptions and show their normative, argumentative relevance through narrative. This text also
illustrates what is left out by thinking of the inclusion of women as the application of a principle
that lets them vote and serve on juries, while not addressing the social imaginaries that shape
their lives and society as a whole. The understanding of narrative in my analysis is quite
different from Taylor’s and from Paul Ricoeur’s, which Taylor frequently cites. Since Ricoeur’s
view is widely accepted—and misleading—I will make a short critique of his view that builds on
my analysis of the story.
The Narrative Utterance and Argument: Ricoeur’s Mistake
In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur divides mimesis into three moments. Mimesis 1 (M1)
addresses the pre-understandings of “the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic
resources, and its temporal character.”47 Mimesis 2 examines the emplotment, which mediates
preunderstandings and readings (M2), while Mimesis 3, the reading, addresses “the intersection
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of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader.”48 The reader’s response to the text,
M3, folds back into M1 as part of the new preunderstandings in the lifeworld, thus completing
the hermeneutic circle.
In Mimesis 1, Ricoeur drives a wedge between narrative and experience in the world at
the same time that he freezes the historical and dialogical character of language and literature.
Ricoeur does not place the subject in language and narratives so that inchoate narratives already
inform experience. To be sure, Ricoeur acknowledges that history and fiction “are preceded by
the use of narrative in daily life.”49 However, “prefiguration” is a cognitive capacity that stands
against the experience of time, which in itself is “confused, unformed, and, at the limit, mute.”50
For Ricoeur, we are not thrown into the narratives of the social imaginary. Thus, Mimesis 1 is “a
structure of human praxis prior to the work of configuration by the historical or the fictional
narrative.”51 This structure is informed by past narratives, past configurations.
Mimesis 2, or emplotment, is not an interpretive act through which the subject intervenes
in the social imaginaries. Ricoeur develops his conception of the novel as emplotment without
reference to imaginaries, the languages of public life or an ontological conception of meaning;
instead, he draws on Aristotle’s Poetics and on Kant’s reflective judgment. Ricoeur isolates and
reduces the configurational act to an ordering by the individual imagination: “I cannot
overemphasize the kinship between this ‘grasping together’ power to the configurational act and
what Kant says about the operation of judging.”52 Emplotment “extracts configuration from a
succession” in the same that way that a reflective judgment “reflects upon the work of thinking at
work in the aesthetic judgment of taste and the teleological judgment applied to organic
wholes.”53 In a stroke, Ricoeur has reduced the author’s engagement with worth and truth of the
languages of social imaginaries to a formal aestheticism.54 Thus, when he says that emplotment
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is the “synthesis of the heterogeneous”—that is, “the diverse mediations performed by the plot:
between the manifold of events and the temporal unity of the story recounted between the
disparate components of the action” 55—the substantive epistemological, normative, and
ontological issues that narratives engage become a merely reflexive ordering. By looking at
narrative as the emplotment of the heterogeneous, Ricoeur blocks out the way in which
emplotment is always a normative re-engagement with the narrative and symbolic shapes the
subject inevitably already inhabits. Ricoeur keeps novelists out of the argument business, limiting
them only to emplotment. “Historians are not simply narrators: they give reasons…. Poets also
create plots that are held together by causal skeletons. But these … are not the subject of a
process of argumentation. Poets restrict themselves to producing the story and explaining by
narrating […]. [Poets] produce, [historians] argue.”56 Glaspell is not the only counter example to
this claim. Proust—one of the novelists he discusses at length in Time and Narrative—makes
extensive arguments against his realist predecessors both by explicit proposition and by narrative
practice.
Since he conceives of narrative as the act of an isolated imagination, it is not surprising
that Ricoeur’s discussion of the novel in Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another is
remarkably ahistorical. Despite the fact that the rise of the novel is embedded in issues of
modernity itself, such as individualism, liberty, and language, Ricoeur ignores them all in his
discussions of literature. For Ricoeur, novels are just examples of how the aporias of cosmic and
experienced time are mediated by plot, or they are “thought experiments” in the Husserlian mold
of imaginative variation in which our thrownness is ignored: “Literature proves to consist in a
vast laboratory for thought experiments in which the sources of variation encompassed by
narrative identity are put to the test of narration.” 57 We are now ready for a very different
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example of how arguing through the social imaginary works, one that does not narrate the
transition from one normative framework to another; instead, we see an aggressive confrontation
of a dominant imaginative framework by alternative.
Obama and the Discursive Constraints of Racial Politics
I will begin with Barack Obama’s famous “race speech,” “A More Perfect Union,” and
show the ways that it is tied to the discursive form of normativity laid down by Brown v. Board.
I then examine how the work of Ta-Nehisi Coates exposes the ways this discursive form protects
the majority from addressing the normative demands of African Americans.
When Obama himself addressed questions of race in his speeches, his language and
reasoning were tied to the normative model of constitutional principles applied to particular
situations, and this model harbors within it the tradition of silence on race that began with the
gag orders prior to the Civil War. The model was given its modern discursive form in Brown v.
Board of Education.58 In this argument for the American conception of equality, an admirable
principle was bound with certain discursive constraints that occlude the world that Ta-Nehesi
Coates, and his predecessors, such as Ralph Ellison, tried to expose. During the Brown
deliberations, Chief Justice Earl Warren gave explicit recommendations to the other justices on
the language of the decision: It “should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical,
unemotional and, above all, nonaccusatory.”59
The Brown decision was not only shaped by the silence about the perpetrators of racist
acts, but by three other features of the discursive landscape. One was the way social scientific
evidence was gathered and used. Brown’s famous footnote 11 to Kenneth Clark’s research,
showing that adolescent black girls preferred white dolls to black ones, and to Gunnar Myrdal’s
American Dilemma. Both were used to establish the “damage hypothesis” and the language of
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victimhood as the appropriate lenses for addressing race. While these languages may have been
effective in breaking down legal segregation, they were also effective in reinforcing
condescension and inequality. The white majority could treat blacks as an object of pity, an
approach that did little to challenge their own self-understanding. The American imagination
could not conceive of injustice without victims, and whites did not recognize that they, not just
African Americans, were damaged by racism. This disempowering condescension can be seen in
the structure of many “progressive” literary works, such as To Kill a Mockingbird, in which we
see black characters only from the point of view of whites, only as the objects of pity. The fact
that this work served as a racial epiphany for many whites reveals how “recognizing” the evils of
segregation can, at the same time, reinforce domination and misrecognition.60
In addition, Myrdal’s work established a pattern of disregarding African American
voices and seeing their culture as a pathological product of the slavery system. He claimed that
African American culture “is a distorted development, or a pathological condition, of the general
American culture.” From this he concluded that it is to the advantage of African Americans as
individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture.61 Myrdal’s text
encouraged white leaders to ignore the voices of African Americans and to urge blacks to
abandon their culture and adapt to the dominant culture.
The third feature of the hegemonic American imagination was interest convergence—that
is, blacks gained social justice primarily when their interests converged with the interests of the
white majority.62 At the time of Brown, as is well-known, the United States’ racial practices were
a source of embarrassment in the Cold War because they undermined America’s image abroad.63
These forces joined the first two elements mentioned to push the court and other elites to support
desegregation without recognizing African American’s autonomy or their voices. Interest
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convergence was not just a sociological phenomenon of domination; it became part of a
discursive form that systematically silenced other forms of writing and living.
These three dimensions of American society hardened into a gag rule that continues
today not only for the court but for mainstream media, though not for African American media,
the black public sphere, and the black church. The mainstream media ignore these languages, for
the most part, until such languages touch a person who is trying to succeed in the mainstream,
such as a presidential candidate.
The exclusion of black voices from the mainstream media did not mean that African
Americans did not speak out. From the time of the Civil War, the black public sphere has split in
many ways from the mainstream public sphere.64 Black writers have taken up the political
responsibility of writing in ways that challenge the dominant narratives of American public life.
The first writer to respond directly to Myrdal’s book was Ralph Ellison, and he directed his
attack at Myrdal’s reading of black culture: “Myrdal sees Negro culture and personality simply
as the product of a ‘social pathology.’” While acknowledging that “Negro” culture has some
undesirable features, Ellison insists in “An America Dilemma: A Review” that “there is much of
great value and richness, which because it has been secreted by living and has made their lives
more meaningful, Negroes will not willingly disregard.”65 Myrdal’s misreadings lead him to
assume that, in Ellison’s words, “it is to the advantage of American Negroes as a group to
become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant
white Americans.” 66 For Ellison, neither white nor black culture can be affirmed in an
unqualified way, for they are both damaged and imbricated in ways that go unnoticed: “What is
needed in our country is not an exchange of pathologies but a change in the basis of society. This
is a job which both Negroes and whites must perform together. In Negro culture there is much of

21

value for America as a whole.”67 Hence, American society needs neither mere integration of
bodies into the same public spaces nor gathering statistics about inequality but a transformation
of the social imaginary into which whites and blacks are integrated. Not surprisingly, Ellison saw
the novel not as an “ordering of the heterogeneous,” as Ricoeur would have it, or the disclosure
of what cannot be said through conceptual assertions, in Taylor’s view, but as an argument: “All
novels of a given historical moment form an argument over the nature of reality and are, to an
extent, criticisms of each other.” 68 Moreover, Ellison understood that revising the social
imaginary (though he never used such a term) is a multidisciplinary affair. He not only took on
Myrdal’s sociological analysis of race, but also Howard Zinn’s historical work, and Richard
Wright’s literary theory and practice.69
Thematizing the social imaginary as part of the deliberative process requires a new model
for political deliberation, a model that calls the self-understanding behind Brown into question
and brings new features of the world out of the background. This alternative way of
understanding normativity is implicit in the works of Ellison, Wright, James Baldwin, Toni
Morrison, and Ta-Nehisi Coates when we read them through this ontological perspective. These
writers are not advocating a “politics of identity” or recognition but challenging the borders of
America’s normative imagination—precisely what Obama was compelled to avoid.
Obama’s “race speech” in 2008 veers away from writings that challenge America’s
collective self-understandings and resorts to an updated version of the Brown model. The speech
came after the media criticized the sermons given by Obama’s minister, Reverend Jeremiah
Wright, in which Wright expressed rage at America’s failures. Wright’s sermon was in the form
of a “jeremiad,” which has a long history in American and African American culture. From the
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Puritans to Frederick Douglas to Martin Luther King, this form has been used to criticize the
promise and failures of America.
Reverend Wright’s sermons were not part of a marginal, radical fringe. They were very
well-known in the African American community and were even used as models for black
divinity school.70 The criticism of Wright by the media displayed not only ignorance of the genre
but, more importantly, a willful ignorance of African American speech and writing, whose
normative claims challenged the dominant white identities and the historical understandings that
underpin them. Obama alludes to the fissure between the discursive universes of blacks and
whites in his speech: “The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of
Reverend Wright’s sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour in
American life occurs on Sunday morning.”71 The oblivion of whites to Reverend Wright’s form
of speech is symptomatic of widespread oblivion about the reality of black lives. “Black lives
matter” not only when they are being profiled and tased—the focus of attention in the news
media—but also when black people are speaking, acting, and laughing.72 When people respond
to the cry of “black lives matter” with “all lives matter,” they are simply repeating the legacy of
Brown by offering an abstract normative principle while refusing to acknowledge the forceful
normative structuring of American life.
Since black people appear in the collective imagination as a group that must be
contained, pitied, and “helped” but never listened to, it is no wonder that Darren Wilson, the
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri who shot the unarmed Michael Brown, told the jury that he
shot Brown because he looked “like a demon,” a force pushing back against the system.73 When
mainstream media finally paid attention, their only question was to ask how anyone running for
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president could listen to such words regularly rather than asking how responsible media could
ignore so many voices that challenged their self-understanding and conception of the world.
In his speech following the release of Wright’s sermons, Obama does give voice to the
anger and disappointment of blacks, but he is careful to balance it with the feelings of unhappy
whites. Moreover, Obama recasts the long and brutal history of systemic and institutionalized
racism as mere moral lapses.74 He must affirm his patriotism and distance himself from language
such as Wright’s by placing this language and its rage at a historical distance from the present:
“For the men and women of Reverend Wright’s generation, the memories of humiliation and
doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years. That
anger may not get expressed in public, in front of white coworkers and white friends. But it does
find voice in the barbershop or the beauty shop or around the kitchen tables … and occasionally
it finds voice in church on Sunday.”75
In order to support the notion of generational differences, as opposed to racial
differences, Obama draws a parallel with his own white grandmother’s occasional racist remarks.
Wright’s comments, like the racism on the white side of Obama’s own family, are like the racism
of a family member of a previous generation, a problem we all have. We can criticize them, but
we cannot “disown” them.76 Moreover, he voices the anger of whites who do not feel that they
have been privileged in a way that justifies affirmative action and other preferential treatments of
African Americans.77 Anger on both sides has proved “counterproductive” because the
realization of all Americans’ dreams is not a zero-sum game, in which realizing one dream
comes at the expense of another.78 He acknowledges that “disparities that exist between the
African American community and the larger American community” and that “the inequalities
passed on from an earlier generation suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow.”79
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However, when it comes to blame, he is careful to balance his criticism of whites with criticisms
of blacks.80
Thus, when Obama notes that the Constitution “was ultimately unfinished. It was stained
by this nation’s original sin of slavery,” he quickly adds that “the answer to the slavery question
was already embedded within our Constitution—a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal
of equal citizenship under the law.”81 From his beginning with “we the people” to his anecdote
of racial unity, Obama affirms what Jack Balkin calls the grand progressive narrative that
dominates America’s self-understanding: “America is continually striving for democratic ideals
from its founding and eventually realizing democracy through its historical development. In this
narrative, the constitution reflects America’s deepest ideals, which are gradually realized through
historical struggle and acts of political courage. The basic ideals of America and American
people are good, even if Americans sometimes act unjustly.”82 In Obama’s reading,
constitutional principle can serve as the basis for an overlapping consensus among major
religions. Obama says: “In the end, then what is called for is nothing more and nothing less than
what all the world’s great religions demand—that we do unto others as we would have them do
unto us. Let us be our brother’s keeper, scripture tells.”83 This ethical principle can be activated
to address problems of race and difference through the idea of “empathy,” through which
universal principle addresses the particulars of individual lives.
Empathy follows from the constructivist understanding of equality because it depends on
the capacity of the individual subject to project himself/herself into another’s life. Defining it
succinctly as a successful attempt to “stand in somebody else’s shoes and see through their
eyes,” Obama regards empathy not as an exceptional gesture but an organizing principle for
ethical behavior and even a preferred way of being.84 By cultivating our capacity for empathy, he
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says, we are forced beyond “our limited vision,” making it possible to overcome what divides us,
allowing us to “find common ground” even in the face of our sharpest disagreements. Obama
makes empathy “the heart of my moral code” and “a guidepost for my politics” in The Audacity
of Hope and in “A More Perfect Union.”85 He ends his speech with the story of Ashley, in which
a black man draws inspiration from a young white woman. The model of empathy fits well with
thinking of normativity as the application of constitutional principles since it is organized around
equal respect and concern for individuals. But this way of understanding normativity has failed
to come to grips with the transsubjective normative structuring of the world. We need to come to
grips with this understanding of normativity if we are to bring into view the racial structuring of
society.
Coates’s Challenge to America’s Dominant Racial Imaginary
Ta-Nehisi Coates’s book has been looked on as a direct reply to Obama’s discussions of
race.86 Coates makes this challenge not by a competing argument organized around principles of
justice or equality. Instead, he reveals the normative languages that imprison African American
lives, languages that include narratives, images, and characters. Against America’s “progressive
narrative” that Balkin identifies, Coates tells his son: “The entire narrative of this country argues
against the truth of who you are.”87 To Coates, these structures are the tissues of rationalization
that encase the subjectivity of a privileged group that Coates calls “the Dreamers,” alluding to
the subtitle of The Audacity of Hope: Reclaiming the American Dream, as well as other versions
of this dream. The dreamers are a self-contained community that does not think of itself as a
community, but whose inhabitants live in a distinctive normative universe. Because their
privilege, empowerment, and normative insularity are invisible to them, this universe is the site
for pronouncements about “justice” and “equality” for society as a whole.
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To capture the self-understanding of the Dreamers, Coates cites Solzhenitsyn’s wellknown remark that “to do evil a human being must first of all believe that what he’s doing is
good, or else that it’s a well-considered act in conformity with natural law.” Coates then
comments: “This is the foundation of the Dream—its adherents must not just believe in it but
believe that it is just, believe that their possession of the dream is the natural result of grit, honor,
and good works. There is a passing acknowledgment of the bad old days, which, by the way,
were not so bad as to have any ongoing effect on our present. The mettle that it takes to look
away from the horror of our prison system, from police forces transformed into armies, from the
long war against the black body, is not forged overnight. This is the practiced habit.”88
Constitutional principles cannot root out inequality for it is woven into the language of
the Dreamers’ world. No thought experiment can lift a Dreamer out of this world or bring an
outsider in. A Dreamer cannot empathize with the kind of life Coates is describing because the
Dreamer needs a new framework for understanding normativity so that the “facts” of a
nondreamer’s life can appear. Coates is not appealing to a politics of identity but thematizing the
ontological force of the reigning normative order.89
Thus, when he speaks of the police violence and of talk about sensitivity training, he is
dismissive because such localization of the problem misses the point. It is not the police who
commit the crimes but the American people locked in the dreamer imaginary: “The truth is that
the police reflect America in all of its will and fear, and whatever we might make of this
country’s criminal justice policy, it cannot be said that it was imposed by a repressive minority.
The abuses that have followed from these policies—the sprawling carceral state, the random
detentions of black people, the torture of suspects—are the product of democratic will.”90
Coates’s language is at once descriptive and normative. He wants to make clear that the

27

dominant collective imagination of most whites and many blacks provides a framework in which
criminality is understood, a framework that is not shared by minorities. He calls this framework
the product of “will” in order to insist on the collective intentionality at work here.91
Coates’s argument here works in a very different way than we find in much legal and
political theory on race, which, for my purposes here, can be conveniently divided into
antidiscrimination and antidomination approaches. The antidiscrimination argument maintains
that the law should be colorblind.92 The antisubordination thesis, on the other hand, argues that
there are large patterns of racial subordination made available through sociological analysis,
patterns that the antidiscrimination thesis systematically occludes by focusing on the intentions
behind laws. Between the World and Me, by contrast, takes aim at the normative weight and
shape of America’s collective imagination that drives research in both of these popular
conceptions but which is thematized by neither one. This is not to say that Coates’s position is
beyond challenge by any means. Rather, my point is that he provides a kind of normative
argument that is unavailable by other approaches to normativity.
Coates’s text is one in a long line of African American writings that have sought to
shake readers loose from their frameworks. However, people do not give up frameworks easily,
particularly frameworks of long standing such as the one which makes its reappearance yet again
beneath the eloquence of Obama’s speech, a reappearance that displays the contemporary form
of America’s continuing gag-order about race.
Conclusion
The ontological turn in political philosophy has offered important new approaches to the
deep structures of past, present, and future societies. However, this line of thought has not
produced a viable theory of the normative utterance that follows from this approach, leaving
itself open to criticism for abstracting from the agency of particular actors and for adopting the
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ambiguous language of world disclosure.93 In this essay, I have proposed a way of thinking about
the relationship of background structures to particular utterances that expands the ways we think
about normativity and argument. Rather than splitting off normative claims from sociological
and narrative approaches to political philosophy, I propose to look at normativity from the
perspective of social imaginaries, the ontological background structures of a given society. In this
view, normativity is inflected by the particular shapes of forms of life but those shapes are never
simply social facts; rather, they are the contestable background of speech and action into which
we are thrown. Prior to questions of principle or fact are the ontological questions that emerge
from social imaginaries and through which we orient ourselves in the world. We cannot point to
the normativity of social imaginaries through the lens of constructivist theory or through the
language of political realism for the context in question is not empirical nor ideal.
This ontological conception responds to the dilemmas that emerge in arguments between
constructivists and realists. Realists complain that constructivist conceptions of normativity are
detached from reality, while constructivists complain that realists and contextualists do not give
an adequate place to normativity.94 The ontological conception makes normativity historical and
contextual but the context starts with the macro structures that make the world and normativity
itself possible. In the work of Glaspell and Coates, we find not just concrete situations presented
phenomenologically but also external description that engages the discursive structures that
display the actors and their dilemmas. However, the texts do not just direct us to facts we
already know; instead, they urge us to look at the background structures that make certain facts
possible and that lock the characters in to their preconceptions— in “Jury,” the women’s
understandings of gender, marriage, etc. and in Between the World and Me, the conflicting
worlds of Dreamers and African Americans. In both texts, we saw how the understanding of
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normativity for a community at any given moment must understood not just as the slow
emergence of macro structures imaginaries that we find in Taylor’s analysis—public sphere,
popular sovereignty, etc.,-- which is done from great historical height with attention to longue
durée, for this view implies that imaginaries are simply the nourishing background for principles
or the shared background that makes debate possible. Instead, we need to attend to the language
the texts use to bring our attention to the ways imaginaries feed ontological divisions within a
political community, divisions that are covered over by the received understandings of both the
real world and how it should be evaluated. As the texts make these structures surface through the
phenomenological presentation of the characters, the reader is encouraged to connect them not
by pointing to particular individuals—“I know someone just like that”—but to patterns, just as
Mrs. Peters finds in Minnie’s text not only a parallel with her own life but an articulation of
violence toward women that has been systematically silenced by the structures of the imaginary.
These structures are both realistic and normative since they make possible what world is
available and the assessment of this world. 95 Normative argument relies on bringing aspects of
the world into view, not only on the application of principles.
In a similar way, Coates’s Between the World and Me attacks the dominant American
framework for understanding race for its failure to grasp the structures of black life, structures
that are brought out through a phenomenological narrative. Coates’s argument reveals insulating
moral narratives—including constitutional ones--that protect the majority from facing the cruelty
that is reproduced daily. Coates shows that the failure to understand is at once epistemic and
normative, a house of privilege that is invisible to the inhabitants at the same time that it makes
those outside invisible. Coates is being “realistic,” but he is not presenting sociological facts and
then arguing for why these facts indicate injustice. Rather, he is striking at the ontology that
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generates facts and norms and therefore opening a space for new historical and sociological
questions that can follow up on his insights. Coates’s text makes clear that the people holding on
to identity politics are not African Americans asking for recognition; rather, the people playing
identity politics are the Dreamers whose identity defines the boundaries and blindnesses of their
world. Coates show how principles enable Dreamers to assume that they have access to all the
normatively relevant aspects of the world and to rationalize their contented inaction. Persuading
the Dreamers means getting them to change the imaginaries that sustain their identities. The
depth of resistance to Coates’s argument can be seen not just in his critics but in the effusive
praise for a speech that conforms to America’s template for deliberation about race, Obama’s “A
More Perfect Union.”
My argument for a new understanding of the normative utterance and social imaginaries
is not just a matter of isolated examples. By showing the link between normativity and realism,
my understanding of the problematic of the social imaginary provides a way to bring together
and mediate the languages of history, literature, and sociology so that they can work together in
normative argument.96 I have focused here on the ways that a short story, a Supreme Court
decision, a speech, and a letter can illuminate the ways the social imaginaries install meanings
and norms and at the same time provide resources for their revision.97 However, arguments
through the imaginary can also be done at the level of macro background history, such as we see
in the competing accounts of secularity in the work of Taylor, Gauchet, Michael Allen Gillespie,
and Mark Lilla.98 These arguments seek to change the background history, which, in turn, will
affect many local debates. The problematic of the social imaginary enables us to understand that
the normative utterance cannot be hived off from the worldhood of the world and that
normativity is woven into the imaginary. The normative utterance is first and foremost an
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engagement with the languages and practices of the social imaginary, for the background is
logically prior to normative propositions and sociological explanations. This means that
normative argument must concern itself with the articulation this background and the discursive
structures through which it is instantiated and challenged. Such arguments will not be as neat as
a Supreme Court decision, but they will give us a lot more to argue with and about than in
thought experiments to produce principles. Although I have developed these two examples to
show some of the possibilities opened by the problematic of social imaginaries, I am not arguing
for the abandonment of the language of principle in all situations; rather, this essay asks for the
inclusion of new kinds of normative arguments that can hear and articulate the world’s
complexity in ways that other ways of thinking and writing cannot.
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